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Abstract—We describe the definition, design, imple-
mentation, and deployment of a secure multi-party
computation protocol and web application. The proto-
col and application allow groups of cooperating parties
with minimal expertise and no specialized resources to
compute basic statistical analytics on their collective
data sets without revealing the contributions of individ-
ual participants. The application was developed specif-
ically to support a Boston Women’s Workforce Council
(BWWC) study of wage disparities within employer
organizations in the Greater Boston Area. The applica-
tion has been deployed successfully to support two data
collection sessions (in 2015 and in 2016) to obtain data
pertaining to compensation levels across genders and
demographics. Our experience provides insights into
the particular security and usability requirements (and
tradeoffs) a successful “MPC-as-a-service” platform
design and implementation must negotiate.
I. Introduction
Companies, educational institutions, government agen-
cies, and other modern organizations have been collecting
and analyzing data pertaining to their internal operations
for some time and with great effect, such as in evaluating
performance or improving efficiency. While each organiza-
tion’s own data has internal value, combining data from
multiple organizations and analyzing it as a single corpus
is likely to provide even more value to the organizations
themselves, to policymakers, or to society at large.
Unfortunately, each organization’s internal data is of-
ten proprietary and confidential, and its release may be
potentially deleterious to the organization’s interests. Or-
ganizations may have the option of releasing sensitive data
selectively to specific agents entrusted with its analysis,
but this is often costly, requires that the organizations
strongly trust the agent, and presents a security risk if
the data is improperly protected at rest.
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) resolves this
tension: aggregate data may be computed and released
while preserving the confidentiality of each organization’s
internal data. Theoretical constructs for MPC have been
known for decades [1]–[4], and recent efforts [5]–[9] are
finally bringing us closer to a point at which these tech-
niques will be available to end-users (i.e., organizations
interested in collectively analyzing their sensitive data).
In this paper, we describe the design of a relatively
modest MPC protocol along with (more importantly) the
implementation and deployment of a web-based service to
compute aggregate metrics without requiring the organi-
zations to trust that service with any sensitive data. We
successfully deployed this service twice to analyze compen-
sation data (broken down by gender and demographics)
from a collection of 40 to 70 employer organizations.
The definition of the protocol and the design and im-
plementation of the software were influenced heavily by
the practical restrictions and challenges of the particular
target application. In particular, human factor constraints
such as comprehension and usability, presented difficulties
that are typically ignored in the design of secure protocols
and by existing MPC frameworks, which are invariably
intended for users with at least some technical expertise
and computing resources.
As a result, we advocate for the design of secure MPC
as a service, with a powerful service provider connected
to data holders and data analysts in a star topology. The
service provider acts as a “smart router”: without learning
any sensitive data, its computational power and network
accessibility enables the other participants to calculate an
analytic using nothing more than a web browser.
II. Scenario and Requirements
In this section, we highlight the scenario that motivated
our work, describe the parties involved in secure MPC,
and survey the security and usability guarantees that we
require of an implementation of secure MPC. We remark
that these requirements overlap: usability of security asser-
tions is important, as otherwise no one understands what
is being guaranteed and what is not.
A. Application Scenario
The Boston Women’s Workforce Council (BWWC) ini-
tiated a study of gender and ethnicity wage gaps among
employers within the Greater Boston Area. As part of
this study, compensation data had to be collected from
privately held companies in order to calculate an aggregate
statistic (sum) over the data points. Each participating
company served as a contributor that submitted cumu-
lative employee earnings aggregated by gender and job
category.
BWWC takes on the role of the dedicated data analyzer.
They may view the employee earnings totals aggregated
across all companies; however, the individual company
aggregates must remain private and must not be revealed
to any single party. The Hariri Institute at Boston Uni-
versity serves as an (untrusted) service provider, supplying
the computational architecture and personnel resources to
facilitate the private aggregation.
B. Parties in Secure MPC and their Trust Relationships
Generalizing from the pay equity scenario, we consider
three types of roles in secure multi-party computation.
• Several contributors who contribute private data for
the calculation of the analytic. The number of contrib-
utors is unbounded and may not be known in advance.
• An automated, publicly-accessible service provider
that connects all other participants without requiring
them to maintain servers (or even to be online simul-
taneously), and that partially calculates the analytic.
• One or more analyzers who receive the output of the
analytic and may also help in computing it.
Both the contributors and analyzers must place some
trust in each other. Analyzers trust that the contributors
submit valid data, while contributors both trust the ana-
lyzers to protect the aggregate output and trust that each
analyzer will not collude with anybody else. If more than
one analyzer is supported, then the contributors’ trust is
federated rather than added: the contributors need only
trust that one of the analyzers is honest.
Critically, nobody needs to entrust the service provider
with any of their data. They only need to believe that the
service provider is incentivized to perform the calculation
on their behalf (i.e., denial of service is out of scope).
C. Security and Privacy Requirements
We rely on multi-party computation with passive (a.k.a.
semi-honest) security and without collusion. This security
notion [10] essentially states that parties cannot learn any
data other than what may be inferred from the aggregate
analytic as long as they all adhere to the protocol.
Passive security suffices in our scenario because the
service provider and analyzer lack any clear incentive to
falsify the results of the aggregation or to learn private
input data. On the contrary, completing the study suc-
cessfully is directly beneficial to BWWC (as the initiator
of the study) as well as to the Hariri Institute (as a
research institute reliant upon a reputation of integrity).
Additionally, obtaining any of the contributors’ private
data creates a liability risk for the service provider and
analyzer. The semi-honest model is very natural in this
case as it protects the service providers from any of the
usual legal risks of processing sensitive data so long as the
parties follow the protocol. Similarly, collusion between
BWWC and the Hariri Institute also exposes liability
risks. Put simply: our threat model leverages the incentives
provided by existing privacy law rather than trying to
supplant it.
Read attacks against the service provider should yield
no private input data, and MPC provides this guarantee.
For write attacks, a tradeoff must be negotiated. While
malicious-secure MPC can thwart write attacks, it does so
by distinguishing between valid and invalid inputs (e.g., by
requiring knowledge of the full set of participants ahead of
time, by having a PKI or some other means of identifying
which inputs come from which participants, and so on).
In this work, supporting an a priori unknown number
of users, not linking inputs to the original contributor,
and a variety of usability requirements enumerated in
Section II-D take precedence.
An implementation must protect the privacy of the
data contributed by the contributors (apart from what
is leaked by the aggregate output) against a semi-honest,
static adversary capable of corrupting at most one party.
Both data at rest and in transit may rely on hardness
assumptions such as RSA [11].
Finally, we note that output privacy (informally speak-
ing) increases with the number of contributors, as the out-
put is an aggregate of the inputs (e.g., in the pathological
case of a single contributor providing input, that input
is necessarily leaked by the output). Thus, the simplicity
and accessibility of the framework, as well as the com-
prehensibility of the underlying cryptographic tools, serve
an important purpose (i.e., indirectly contributing to the
overall security of the protocol by encouraging participa-
tion). As a lower bound, we also require that a minimum of
five contributors provide data before the service provider
allows the analyzer to compute an analytic. We currently
do not quantify output leakage formally, though doing
so within the framework of differential privacy presents
interesting directions for future work.
D. Usability Requirements
A secure multi-party computation protocol only has
value if multiple parties trust it and use it. In particu-
lar, our pay equity scenario involves individuals with a
wide range of technical backgrounds utilizing computing
resources that are outside of our control and are governed
by a variety of organizational constraints. Therefore, our
protocol and web service must satisfy many usability goals.
• Comprehensibility: To drive adoption, the secure
MPC protocol must be simple for users to understand.
• Auditability: To inspire trust, the web service must
have complete transparency, with open-source code
to enable outside auditing. Additionally, the secure
MPC protocol must never give sensitive data to the
service, not even the aggregate output of the analysis.
• Accessibility: To minimize any hurdles that might
discourage participation, the software must be easily
and rapidly deployable, requiring no setup, special-
ized software, specialized hardware, or public Internet
addresses for any of the contributors or the analyzer.
• Simplicity: The software must be usable within a
relatively narrow time window by non-expert human
contributors whose technical expertise may only in-
clude basic familiarity with spreadsheet applications
and web browsing clients.
• Asynchronicity: Contributors only need to be online
while entering their data, and analyzers only need to
be online at no more than two points in the protocol:
to start the process and to compute the analytic.
• Idempotence: contributors must be able to resubmit
(i.e., update) their data if they discover the data
they submitted was corrupted (either through human
error, through a software application failure, or both).
• Feedback: Incorrect or malformed data from even
one contributor destroys the value of the aggregate
analytic. Hence, the web interface must proactively
warn users about spurious data (see Figure 1).
III. Existing Off-the-shelf Tools
The past few years have seen several successful de-
ployments of MPC [12]–[14]. Consequently, mature soft-
ware frameworks are available [5], [6]. In this section, we
highlight two natural “off-the-shelf” candidate solutions
and discuss how they fell short of meeting the usability
requirements outlined in Section II-D.
Viff: Viff [5], relying on linear-secret-sharing (LSS), is
an open-source MPC framework implemented as a Python
module on top of the popular networking framework
Twisted. Viff overloads operators to allow the programmer
to specify high-level arithmetic protocols (supporting the
composition of sum, product, and comparison operations)
without explicitly managing the underlying networking
and cryptographic operations. Viff offers great flexibility
in the number of parties (2 to n) and security guarantees
(passive, active, with various corruption thresholds).
However, Viff unrealistically1 requires all contributors,
service providers, and analyzers to run the Viff software
on mutually available servers. To overcome some of this
burden, we extended Viff to run on two servers hosted by
two separate service providers and to allow contributors to
use a browser to submit data in secret-shared form.2 The
analyzer acts as one of the service providers and retrieves
the results using Viff’s built-in output mechanism.
Even so, Viff still fails to meet two usability require-
ments: asynchronicity (both service providers must be
simultaneously online for the duration of the computation)
and accessibility (BWWC lacks the technical expertise to
configure a web server, obtain a web certificate, and install
our Viff prototype and dependencies). We rejected the
alternative of the Hariri Institute deploying a server on
BWWC’s behalf, as it places too much trust in the service
provider.
1Apart from usability, the performance of an LSS-based scheme
degrades as the number of computing parties grows.
2Our prototype implementation is available at https://github.
com/n1v0lg/salary-equity-proto.git.
Sharemind: Another candidate framework is Share-
mind, commercial software implementing a highly opti-
mized LSS-based MPC scheme. Sharemind offers an ex-
tensive suite of privacy-preserving operations ranging from
basic arithmetic to statistical and relational operations
[15]. Contributors (respectively, analyzers) submit data
to (resp., retrieve results from) the service providers via
a web-based interface. Protocols are specified in SecreC
[16], a domain-specific, C-like language. While Sharemind
is building out support for two-party protocols [17], the
core framework assumes three service providers and offers
passive, honest-majority security.
We remark that Sharemind’s complexity and closed-
source design inhibit comprehension and auditing. Addi-
tionally, deployment requires advanced technical expertise
and multiple service providers. The web-based platform
Secure Survey [18] resolves the deployment issues but
introduces legal concerns for potential contributors in
the US. Built on top of Sharemind, Secure Survey lets
contributors use a web browser to submit secret shares of
their data to three Sharemind service providers hosted by
Cybernetica, Partisia, and Alexandra Institute, who then
perform the secure computation. However, with servers
located outside of US jurisdiction, it may be unclear to
potential contributors in our study what remedies are
available if the service providers collude.
Lastly, we point out that neither Viff nor Sharemind
provide formal security guarantees. Currently available
secure computation frameworks that do (e.g., ObliVM
[7] or Wysteria [9]) are research prototypes not presently
developed for production-level deployment.
IV. Protocol Definition
The protocol ultimately developed for this application is
a variant of a technique that allows multiple parties to col-
lectively compute a sum of their own individual quantities
without revealing those quantities to one another [19].
A. Drawbacks of the Existing Protocol
The naïve secure sum protocol requires all partici-
pants to coordinate with one another to pass data in
sequence so that it visits each participant exactly once.
From an implementation standpoint, this would require
a relatively sophisticated software infrastructure involving
multiple client/server applications that would all commu-
nicate with one another and maintain state throughout
the duration of the computation, complicating the soft-
ware implementation process and increasing the chance
of runtime errors. The synchronization requirement would
also require each participant to run the application for
the duration of the computation, which may span days or
weeks. Finally, the sequenced approach does not support
idempotent updates from contributors; if even one partic-
ipant makes an error and wishes to resubmit their data,
the entire protocol would need to be restarted.
B. Our Protocol
Let G be an appropriate additive group such as Z/264Z
and distinguish each contributor using an index i ∈
{1, ..., n}. We call a single execution of the protocol a
session and it proceeds in the following way:
(1) the analyzer initiates the process by generating a
secret and public RSA key pair (s, p) and a unique
session identifier j ∈ N, submitting p to the service
provider, and sending j to all the contributors;3
(2) each of the n contributors possesses a secret data
value di ∈ G and does the following at least once4:
(a) generate a secret random mask mi ∈ G and
calculate the masked data ri = di +mi,
(b) send ri to the service provider and retrieve p from
the service provider to send back ci = Encp(mi);
(3) the service provider computes the sum of the masked
data values to obtain the aggregate masked data
quantity R =
∑n
i=1 ri;
(4) the analyzer then retrieves R and all the c1, . . . , cn
from the service provider, computes mi = Decs(ci)
for all i, computes M =
∑n
i=1mi, and obtains the
final result R−M =∑ni=1 di.
The service provider never sees the random masks
because they are encrypted using the analyzer’s public
key, and the analyzer never sees the individual masked
data values unless it violates its promise not to collude
with the service provider.5 Figure 1 illustrates an example
deployment of the protocol for two contributors.
Our protocol guarantees that any malicious outside
participant that can observe and permanently store all
the communications between any and all participants will
gain no information beyond the aggregate being computed.
We exploit this feature of the protocol in the implementa-
tion: the server used for housing the data communicated
between parties does not need to be secure and can
be commodity hardware purchased from any third-party
provider. The security of our protocol relies on RSA [20]
or any equivalent public-key cryptographic protocol.
V. Client and Server Implementations
The purpose of the software application is to allow a
group of non-expert participants to execute a session of
the protocol defined in Section IV-B. In particular, the
software application automates all portions of the protocol
except the initiation of a session (which can be done
with a single manual click), the distribution of the session
3The session identifier is only to allow distinct sessions, but it can
serve another purpose: if no malicious agent possesses the session
identifier, any data submitted by malicious agents will be ignored
during the computation of the result.
4Each contributor can perform step (2) as many times as they wish
before step (3) occurs; the operation they perform is idempotent if
they always submit the same data.
5It is possible for the service provider to keep only a running total
and immediately discard each submitted masked data value, but this
merely makes it more difficult and not impossible for a malicious
analyzer to obtain that data.
identifier (which are simply delivered to participants via
email), and the entry of participant data (participants
must use the client-facing interface to paste or enter the
data before submitting). Since realistic scenarios involve
not one numeric quantity per participant but a collection
or table of labeled quantities, the software application
actually implements the protocol in parallel on multiple
labelled fields within a table. Beyond these features, the
software application was developed under the constraints
already enumerated in Section II-D, which informed the
design and implementation decisions for the application.
The two main components of the application are (1)
the back-end server that acts as the service provider
and as the delivery mechanism for the client-facing in-
terfaces, and (2) the client-facing interactive interfaces
to be used by the analyzer and participants. The server
is implemented using the Node.js framework. Server-side
data is stored within an instance of MongoDB , and the
application interacts with that instance using the Mon-
goose module. SSL/TLS is supported using Let’s Encrypt
via the letsencrypt-express module [21]. The client-facing
interface is implemented using JavaScript, employing the
jQuery, Underscore.js, Handsontable, JSEncrypt [22], and
spdy [23] libraries, in particular.
As both the server and client applications are authored
using JavaScript, critical components such as the aggre-
gate computation routines are shared between the com-
ponents, reducing the likelihood of errors and facilitating
maintenance and updates to the application. The actual
fields of the table displayed to users are programmatically
generated and can be modified in a given deployment.
The JSEncrypt library is used to employ 1024 bit RSA
encryption for encrypting the participant masks. The
participant masks themselves are generated as arrays
of pseudo-random numbers using the window.crypto or
window.msCrypto object [24], which uses a high amount
of entropy from the host operating system to ensure that
any patterns that could be discovered in the generated
numbers are minimized. Of course, it is worth noting that
if a participant uses a compromised implementation of a
web browser, the implementation of the object may not
conform to the published specification.
Figure 1 illustrates the web interface6 as it appears
within a web browser to each contributor. The participant
interface provides a familiar spreadsheet table that an
end-user can fill with data either manually or by pasting
the data from another application. The email address
is hashed on the client side and this hashed value is
used only as an index into the server database, allowing
each participant to submit more than once in a session
(overwriting their previous submissions). There is also an
analyzer interface that allows the analyzer to start a ses-
sion, obtain a session identifier, and save a private RSA key
to their local storage. There are also two other interfaces
6The client application can be viewed at http://100talent.org.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of a deployment of the protocol for two contributors used to explain the protocol to potential contributors (left) and the
contributor web interface at http://100talent.org as it appears within a web browser with some user errors highlighted (right).
for the analyzer: a session tracker that displays how many
participants submitted data, and a final unmasking and
computation interface that requires them to supply the
private key to the local client interface running in their
browser in order to compute the final aggregate data. If
too few participants have submitted their data, the service
provider will not allow the analyzer to compute the final
aggregate data. Once the final aggregate data is computed,
it is displayed in the same familiar table format as the
input table presented to individual participants.7
As discussed in Section II-C and IV-B, the ability to
read any data on the server housing the database and de-
livering the client interfaces over the web to user browsers
does not affect the security of the MPC protocol. Thus,
all the interfaces are publicly accessible.
VI. Deployment and Future Vision
The protocol and software application described in this
work were deployed successfully in 2015 and again in 2016
to collect compensation data for the purpose of pay equity
analytics [25], [26]. The practical difficulties deploying
the software application involved browser and operating
system incompatibilities, human errors in using the ap-
plication and the associated technical support activities,
and the scheduling and duration of the data collection
sessions. The simplicity of the protocol and its implemen-
tation greatly helped decision makers feel confident that
they understood its operation and the security guarantees
and contingencies that participation entailed. Hence, the
participating employers (about 40 in the first collection
and about 70 in the second) contributed data to the
calculation of an aggregate analytic with confidence that
their individual data would not be shared or released.
A more general-purpose platform enabling this type
of privacy-preserving collective analysis has far reaching
potential for public initiative research studies. Such a
platform can allow for larger, more in-depth analyses and
7It is the responsibility of the analyzer to destroy their local copy
of the private key after retrieving the result if this is the agreed-upon.
could accommodate other research needs where sensitive
information from multiple parties must be collectively
processed in order to identify trends, diagnose problems,
or test hypotheses. Areas of application range from smart
cities [27], to genomics [28], to cybersecurity [29], [30].
Based on our experiences, we believe this effort requires
a collaboration between the security engineering, human-
computer interaction, and social science communities.
First, we advocate that the security community com-
bine the visions of secure multi-party computation and
cloud computing. Secure MPC enables the most powerful
computing entity to be the least trusted one. We envision a
platform that provides strong computing and networking
capabilities to “thin client” end users such that trust is
inversely proportional to computing power.
Second, to achieve good usability, this platform should
function using a star topology, where all contributors
and analyzers use browser clients or mobile applications.
Additionally, our experiences highlight the need for a
general-purpose MPC platforms to deploy strong UI/UX
features before deployment, since by its very nature MPC
complicates detection of errors post-collection.
Third, deploying any such platform involves overcom-
ing not only technical and logistical challenges, but also
challenges that may be appropriate to address under
the umbrella of social science studies encompassing law,
organizational psychology, and behavioral economics. One
particular experience we had deploying the application
was that despite the guarantees provided by secure MPC,
some participants still required that the analyzer and the
service provider sign a non-disclosure agreement governing
data submitted by those participants, even though this
data contained no meaningful information content. In fact,
contributors to secure MPC would benefit more from the
creation of a different legal construct: a “non-collusion
agreement” with enforceable civil penalties. More gener-
ally, we believe that social scientists can both contribute
toward and receive great benefit from a general-purpose
platform for the secure calculation of aggregate analytics.
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